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poration is dissolved, actions by or against it abate.45 The crucial
question in cases of this lund is whether the appointment of the
receiver actually operates as a dissolution of the corporation
under applicable law.4 6 As it appeared that the corporation was
actually dissolved under Texas law the court correctly applied
principles of conflict of laws to this situation.4 7 But even though
a corporation is civilly dead in the state of incorporation, it may
be considered still alive in another state under a statute continuing the corporate existence for the purpose of winding up in respect to remedies of that state's citizens against property in its
jurisdiction.48 An interesting question not passed on by the
in Louisiana could be reached
court is whether the fund4deposited
9
by non-resident creditors.
VI. PROCEDURE
Robert W. Williams*
A comparatively large number of cases touching on procedural questions were decided by the supreme court at its 19441945 term, but, as is so often the case, the majority of these questions should never have been raised because of the certainty of
the rules which were invoked. However, several very intriguing
questions were presented to and decided by the court and will
undoubtedly lend themselves to more intensive study than is
contemplated by this summary.
Appeals, Appellate Jurisdictionand Procedure
Walsh v. Bush1 presents one of the increasingly numerous
phenomena growing out of the housing shortage which has
gripped the entire country. Here, plaintiff sued for $5,030.00
damages caused by defendant's interference with plaintiff's occupancy of a residence and garage rented by him from defendant
45. Musson v. Richardson, 11 Rob. 37 (La. 1845); McCoy v. State Line
Oil & Gas Co., 180 La. 579, 157 So. 116 (1934). See La. Act 250 of 1928, § 62
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1142].
46. See Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Guwang, 15 So. (2d) 148 (La.
App. 1943).
47. See 2 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) H§ 157.2, 192.3.
48. 16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (1942)
§ 8115, citing Rodgers v. Adriatic Fire Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 34, 42 N.E. 515 (1895).
49. See Cognovich v. Sun Indemnity Co. of New York, 176 La. 373, 145 So.
774 (1933), cited supra note 3.
* Lecturer on Louisiana Practice, Louisiana State University Law
School. Member of the Bar of Baton Rouge.
1. 206 La. 303, 19 So. (2d) 144 (1944).
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under a verbal, month to month lease, at twenty-five dollars per
month. He charged that defendant had broken a flower pot full
of dirt over plaintiff's porch, had padlocked the garage and had
filed eviction proceedings against plaintiff in the First City Court
of New Orleans, said proceedings having been dismissed. The
lower court awarded plaintiff twenty-five dollars in damages and
plaintiff appealed to the supreme court asking for an increase in
the award. The court held, and properly so, that the amount
claimed as damages was grossly inflated and that plaintiff could
not reasonably expect damages as high as two thousand dollars
under the facts alleged and proved. The case was accordingly
transferred to the Orleans Court of Appeal. The court had, of
course, ample authority for its position.'
Roccaforte v. Barbin' was a suit to annul a contract to purchase real property and to recover an eight hundred dollar deposit made by the plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment
of dismissal on an exception of no right or cause of action.
Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the
case did not present the proper jurisdictional amount and that
the appeal bond was not conditioned as required by law for a devolutive appeal. The court properly held that the suit involved
not only the return of the eight hundred dollars deposit, but also
the rescission of a contract for the purchase of eight thousand
dollars worth of real property. The motion to dismiss because
of the defect in the bond was not entertained due to the fact that
it was not filed until after the lapse of more than three days from
the return date. In the event there is a failure to file such motion within this period the court will not consider it unless the
defect complained of is jurisdictional or strikes at the foundation
of the appeal.
The appeals in City of Gretna v. Aetna Life Insurance Company4 and its companion case, City of Gretna v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Company5 were transferred to the proper court
of appeal 6 because of the lack of the necessary jurisdictional
amount. Defendants had argued that the appeals were properly
2. See Cusachs v. Salem Brick and Lumber Co., Ltd., 144 La. 411, 80 So.
608 (1919). See also La. Act 19 of 1912 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1427-1428],
authorizing the transfer of the appeal to the proper court of appeal.

The

court also transferred the appeal in Torres v. Serpas, 207 La. 36, 20 So. (2d)
416 (1944), an election contest over the office of police Juror for St. Bernard
Parish when it was shown that the emolument for the entire four year term
alnounted to only $1,500.00.

3.
4.
5.
6.

207 La. 924, 22 So.
207 La. 1085, 22 So.
207 La. 1089, 22 So.
La. Act 19 of 1912

(2d) 271 (1945).
(2d) 658 (1945).
(2d) 660 (1945).
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1427-1428].
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lodged in the supreme court because the legality of a taxing statute was at issue. The court found, however, that the taxing statute had already been upheld when the principal case was before
it on appeal from a judgment sustaining an exception of no cause
7
of action.
In Placid Oil Company v. North Central Texas Oil Company,
8
Incorporated,
one party to an interpleader proceeding appealed
from the judgment of the trial court. One of the appellees answered the appeal, asking for an amendment of the judgment
against the other appellee. Judge O'Niell, speaking for the court,
denied the right of an appellee to seek an amendment of the
original judgment without having taken an appeal from it. Numerous authorities were cited in support of this doctrine. There
is language in the case of City of Shreveport v Kahn9 which
would seem to support the contention of the appellee who answered the appeal. However, the Kahn case stands only for the
proposition that such appellee may seek modification of the judgment insofar as it affects appellant and does not extend to a case
such as the one here where one appellee seeks to change the
judgment as between the co-appellees.
The court had occasion again to announce that an appellee
has the burden of proving alleged defects in the taking of an appeal. In Waldhauser v. Adam Hats, Incorporated,10 appellee
moved to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of eviction on the
ground that the judgment was not timely filed. Having failed
to prove definitely that the appeal was not entered within the
twenty-four hour period allowed by law-" the appellee was considered as not having discharged this burden; hence the motion
was denied.
The right of an appellant to dismiss the appeal voluntarily
was settled by the case of Gravity DrainageDistrictNo. 2 v. Edwards,1 2 a case particularly interesting to attorneys employed on
contingencies. The drainage district filed suit against various
defendants on a depository bond. During the pendency of the
suit, a majority of the members of plaintiff board filed a motion
asking that the suit be dismissed and giving their reasons for the
request. The trial court entered an order of dismissal and plaintiff, through its special counsel, appealed. After the appeal was
7. City of Gretna v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 206 La. 715, 20 So. (2d) 1 (1944).
8. 206 La. 693, 19 So. (2d) 616 (1944).
9. 194 La. 55, 193 So. 461 (1939).
10. 206 La. 875, 20 So. (2d) 165 (1944).
11. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 2155-2158 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6597-6600].
12. 207 La. 1, 20 So. (2d) 405 (1944).
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lodged in the supreme court, the board filed a resolution instructing counsel to dismiss the appeal and, in the event he failed or
refused to do so, requesting that the District Attorney for the
Twenty-first Judicial District carry out the board's wishes. Special counsel for the board refused to so move and the board,
through the district attorney and joined by the attorneys for the
defendant, moved that the supreme court dismiss the appeal.
The special counsel for the board opposed the motion on various
grounds, among which was the contention that the board could
not dismiss the appeal to his prejudice inasmuch as he had been
retained upon a contingent fee. The court discredited this contention, stating that it was "universally recognized that a client
may revoke the employment of his attorney at will, and this is
true even though the attorney is serving for a contingent fee."' 8
Special counsel further urged that a succeeding board could
not dismiss a suit authorized by its predecessor and thereby donate the amount involved in the suit to the defendants. The
court waved this objection aside with the statement that the
only inhibition placed on a voluntary dismissal of an appeal is
the refusal of the appellees to give their consent.
By supplemental brief, the special counsel asked that the
supreme court set his fee for the work performed by him. The
court pointed out that no judgment could be rendered under the
motion except a judgment of dismissal and that since the amount
of the fee, which could be on a quantum meruit basis only, had
not been adjudicated upon by the lower court, it could not at this
time be considered on appeal.
Pool v. Gaudin 4 involved an appeal from a judgment dismissing a suit for damages for an alleged libel. Defendant moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground (1) that the appeal was
granted upon plaintiff's written motion, rather than petition,
filed during the vacation period of the district court that followed
the term of court during which the judgment was pronounced,
and (2) that the motion did not pray for, nor did the court order
the citation and service of defendant. Appellant showed that the
citation was actually issued to defendant and pleaded that it was
immaterial that the appeal was obtained by motion rather than
by petition and, further, that defendant, by failing to file his motion to dismiss within three days of the return day, had waived
his rights to have the appeal dismissed.
The court, through Justice Fournet, refused to dismiss the
13. 207 La. 1, 6, 20 So. (2d) 405, 406.
14. 207 La. 403, 21 So. (2d) 424 (1945).
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appeal for the reason that the fact that the citation was actually
made upon defendant cured all defects in the appeal itself. The
court found it unnecessary to pass upon appellant's second contention that defendant had waived his right to object to the appeal because of his failure to file his motion to dismiss within
three days of the return date.
The question of the timely filing of the transcript of appeal,
a question which seems to plague the court at every term, reared
its ugly head again in the case of Stafford's Estate v. Progressive
National Farm Loan Association 5 and Succession of Edenborn.16
In the latter case, defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that the transcript was not timely filed
and asked that the supreme court rescind an order granting an
extension of time for filing the transcript on the ground that appellant's motion for such extension did not set forth the true reasons for the delay in filing. In the alternative, appellees ask that
the appeal be dismissed on the ground that the transcript is not
in the form required by law. The extension of time for filing
the transcript was granted on a certificate of the clerk of the
lower.court to the effect that more time was needed for its preparation. Appellees contend that if the clerk had started preparation of the transcript at the time the appeal was entered that
it could have been completed by the return day and that appellant was at fault in not making it possible for the clerk to begin
the transcript. However, the court, investigating the reasons for
the delay, found as a fact that the delay in having the clerk start
preparation was due to the inability of the appellant, appellees
and the clerk to agree upon what should be included in the transcript. Hence, the court felt that its order for an extension of
time was not improvidently issued and that the failure to file
the transcript within the original return day was not due wholly
to the appellant's fault and neglect.
The court also found that the transcript was not properly
filed because certain original exhibits were attached to one transcript and that the other copies did not contain copies of these
exhibits. Further, a record of the federal district court, which
was to be used in evidence in this case, was not properly included
in the transcripts. However, the court applied the provisions of
15. 207 La. 1097, 22 So. (2d) 662 (1945). Here the objection was made
that the transcript was not timely filed, but this argument was abandoned
when the mover became aware of the fact that an extension of time had
been granted pursuant to Art. 883, La. Code of Practice of 1870, and the
transcript had been filed within the extended period.
16. 208 La. 25, 22 So. (2d) 673 (1945).
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Louisiana Act 234 of 193217 and allowed appellant additional time
within which to properly prepare his transcript.
In Union Sulphur Company v. Campbell, Is Town of Abbeville v. Police Jury of Vermilion Parish,'9 and Barnes v. LeBlanc"
the court was required to apply three rules that need no discussion. In the former case, the court stated that it could not disturb the judgment of the trial court, even though such judgment
might be erroneous on its face, when the party aggrieved thereby
did not appeal from the decree. 2 In the second case, the court
refused to entertain an attack upon the constitutionality of a
statute when that attack was made for the first time in the brief
of appellant. In the third case, the court refused to upset the
trial judge's finding of fact where there was conflicting testimony,
but where there was ample evidence for the trial judge to decide
as he did.
In Graziani v. Elder & Walters Equipment Company, Incorporated, 22 appellant had applied for and received an order for a
suspensive appeal from a judgment rejecting a money demand.
Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
appeal bond had not been filed within ten days from the date the
judgment was signed. Justice Ponder, as the organ of the court,
correctly held that the appeal could not be considered as a suspensive appeal inasmuch as there was nothing to suspend. He
thereupon treated the appeal as devolutive and refused the motion to dismiss because the bond had been filed timely for such
appeal.
17. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1978.1.
This statute, which has done much
towards liberalizing appeal procedure and which has been used on many occasions for the promotion of justice in the appellate courts, reads in part

as follows: "Whenever an appellant files an incomplete transcript, or files
the transcript or a further application for an extension, within three judicial
days after the return day, or omits to file as part of the record any trans-

script exhibits offered in evidence, or whenever because of any error on the
part of the Clerk of Court or of the trial Judge, or for any purely technical
reason, a motion to dismiss his appeal is filed either by an appellee, third
person or intervenor, charging and setting forth as grounds for dismissal

any of the above reasons, no appellate court shall maintain said motion to
dismiss, or dismiss the appeal, unless it first allow to the appellant at least
two additional days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, to cure and correct

any and all the informalities and irregularities alleged and complained of
in the motion to dismiss; and such appellant may, before the date on which
the motion to dismiss is fixed for trial, cure and correct any objection, irregularity or informality charged or alleged to exist in the motion to dismiss, and if it appears to the appellate court that he has done so, the motion
to dismiss shall be denied."
18. 207 La. 514, 21 So. (2d) 626 (1945).
19. 207 La. 779, 22 So. (2d) 62 (1945).
20. 207 La. 989, 22 So. (2d) 404 (1945).
21. However, the court, by virtue of Art. 547, La. Code of Practice of
1870, corrected an obvious error of calculation in the trial court's judgment.
22. 208 La. 80, 22 So. (2d) 841 (1945).
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Justice Ponder did not consider the case of Bujol v Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company2 3 in reaching the above result. That
opinion was rendered earlier in the term and involved a construction of Section 5 of Louisiana Act 29 of 1924,24 which has
been the subject of much controversy in the past. Here, certain
members of a railroad brotherhood filed suit against the Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company, the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, and various railroad brotherhoods to have an agreement
between the companies and the brotherhoods dated June 2, 1927,
declared effective and to have a certain decree of the Board of
Appeals of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, which attempted to change the agreement of June 2, 1927, declared illegal
for reasons set forth in the petition. Plaintiffs also obtained a
restraining order and rule nisi for a preliminary injunction. The
named defendant filed exception of misjoinder on the ground
that its trustee in bankruptcy was the proper party defendant.
The other defendants filed exceptions to the citation. All defendants filed motions to dissolve the restraining order. The trial
judge sustained the exception of misjoinder and dismissed the
suit as to the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and sustained
the motions to dissolve. The restraining order and rule nisi were
vacated and the suit dismissed as to all respondents. Plaintiffs
applied for devolutive and suspensive appeals and the lower
court issued an order denying a devolutive appeal from the
order of court recalling the rule nisi for the reason that the case
in its entirety was dismissed and the court felt that the only appeal permissible was a suspensive one. However, a devolutive
appeal was granted from the judgment dismissing the suit as to
the named defendant and a suspensive appeal was granted from
the judgment dismissing the suit in its entirety.
Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds (1)
that the devolutive appeal was frivolous, (2) that the petition
failed to show facts sufficient to show appellate jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court and (3) that under Section 5 of Act 29 of
1924 a suspensive appeal is not allowed from a decree refusing a
preliminary injunction, but only a devolutive appeal can be had.
The court felt that the first objection pertained to the merits of
the case and refused to consider it. It brushed the second objection aside because appellant had filed affidavits in the supreme
court showing that the necessary jurisdictional amount was involved. In treating the last, and most serious objection, the court
23. 207 La. 123, 20 So. (2d) 608 (1944).
24. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2082.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. V1

held that the appeals were properly taken and that the appellants, by failing to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court, had no further appellate relief which would have
the effect of suspending the judgment recalling the restraining
order and the rule nisi and that a devolutive appeal was proper.
It further held that a suspensive appeal from the judgment dismissing the suit in its entirety was available to plaintiffs, though
the court admitted that such an appeal would not have the effect
of suspending in the action taken by the district court. Section
5 of Act 29 of 1924 was deemed not applicable inasmuch as it
deals with interlocutory decrees only and does not apply to a
final judgment such as was rendered here.
Chief Justice O'Niell concurred in the result, but dissented
from the holding of the majority that the appeal was suspensive
rather than devolutive. He pointed out that there was nothing
in the judgment for the suspensive appeal to suspend 25 and made
by the majority
the amazing observation that the cases cited
26
were, in the main, authority for his position.
Conservatory Writs
There appears to have been during the 1944-1945 term a
dearth of decisions involving the issuance and effect of conservatory writs, one of the most important and widely used phases of
procedural law. Moreover, none of the few decisions on this subject which were handed down was of any significance. First Na27
tional Bank Building Company, Limited v. Dickson & Denny
discussed the effect of an illegal seizure by provisional seizure of
the law books and office equipment of a firm of attorneys. Such
property was, of course, exempt from seizure and the defendants
reconvened for damages. The court, after stating the well settled rule that only actual damages could be recovered, found that
the defendants had suffered no monetary loss because of the fact
that the sheriff had designated them as custodians of the seized
property and they had never been out of possession. Defendants
25. This objection to the naming of the appeal does not seem sufficient.
The law grants one a right to a "suspensive" appeal, Arts. 564, 565, 575, La.
Code of Practice of 1870, and such judgment does not only suspend execution of the judgment, but also stays all further proceedings until the judgment can be reviewed on appeal.
26. Due to the fact that defendants did not know exactly what effect
the suspensive appeal had upon the litigation, the railroad companies filed
A declaratory judgment proceeding in the Federal District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana and interpleaded the brotherhoods and the
instant plaintiffs. Judgment was there rendered for plaintiffs in the principal case and the suit is now on appeal to the United States Circuit Court.
27. 207 La. 298, 21 So. (2d) 226 (1945).
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argued further that they were entitled to damages for the embarrassment and humiliation they had suffered. The court held,
and properly so, that their alleged humiliation and embarrassment was caused, not by the seizure, but by the suit itself, which
was for unpaid office rent. After finding no malice on the part
of the seizing creditor, which would have been sufficient to allow
the granting of an award for damages, the court reiterated the
rule that since the humiliation caused by the issuance of the writ
could not be differentiated from the humiliation caused by the
suit itself, the could would refuse to entertain defendants' reconventional demand.
2' 8
the
In Sugar Field Oil Company, Incorporated v. Carter,
court ordered, by virtue of Code of Practice Article 303,29 the issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent the distribution
of a sum of money held by an individual for the benefit of the
named defendant's creditors. Plaintiff had agreed for a consideration, later set at the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, to
find a purchaser for defendant Carter's property, which was at
that time under the control of defendant Hereford and being
administered by him for the benefit of Carter's creditors. Plaintiff alleged that through his efforts a purchaser had been found
and asked that judgment be given him for the agreed consideration. In the alternative, plaintiff prayed that he be paid on a
quantum meruit basis. It was proved that the sale had not been
actually consummated, but that the prospective purchaser had
given Hereford sixty-five thousand dollars for an option, the
money to be forfeited to him if the option was not exercised. The
court held that under the plaintiff's alternative plea it might be
that he would be entitled to recovery and if the fund was distributed to Carter's creditors before recognition of plaintiff's
claim, it would work irreparable injury to plaintiff.
In re Hibernia Bank & Trust Company"° allowed the state
bank commissioner to sequester 3 1 certain books and documents
belongirg to the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company in liquidation
and to obtain the latter's release to him without furnishing bond.
The court held that by virtue of Louisiana Act 153 of 1912,32 the
28. 207 La. 453, 21 So. (2d) 495 (1945).
29. "Besides the cases above mentioned, courts of justice may grant
injunctions in all cases when it is necessary to preserve the property in dis-

pute during the pendency of the action, and to prevent one of the parties,
during the continuance of the suit, from dilapidating the same, or from

doing some other act injurious to the other party."
30. 207 La. 995, 22 So. (2d) 406 (1945).

31. Art. 279, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
32. Dart's Stats. (1939)

§ 707.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VI

commissioner was not required to furnish judicial bonds while
acting in behalf of a state bank as liquidator.
Exceptions, Rules and Motions
Exceptions of estoppel and of no right or cause of action
were overruled in City of New Orleans v. Westwego Canal and
Terminal Company, Incorporated." This was a suit under Act 38
of 190831 to establish title to vacant property and defendant contended that, inasmuch as plaintiff had instituted an action in jactitation and trespass against it, involving the same property, and
as that suit had been dismissed on defendant's motion for want of
prosecution,35 plaintiff was now estopped from maintaining this
action. The court was given ample authority to the effect that a
suit dismissed for want of prosecution does not decide any issues
between the parties and does not preclude the plaintiff from
bringing the same suit a second time, provided that prescription
had not run on the original claim, not considering the abandonment decree as an interrupting factor. The exceptions of no right
or cause of action were based on the proposition that defendant's
title to the property in question was set out in plaintiff's petition. However, the court had no trouble in overruling these exceptions in view of the fact that Act 38 of 19086 contemplates a
suit against a person who is asserting rights to property by virtue
of a record title and a decision relating to the superiority of the
title. Hence, plaintiff's allegation setting out defendant's record
title could not constitute an admission of defendant's ownership.
In City of Gretna v. Aetna Life Insurance Company3 7 the
court, on an appeal from a judgment sustaining an exception of
no cause of action, rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the
merits of the case. However, the court rectified this obvious
error on rehearing and restricted its judgment to overruling the
exception. It was stated that the court's error was brought about
by the existence in the record of a stipulation of facts which the
attorneys intended to use on the trial of the case. In the case of
Terry v. Womtack, 88 the court used the City of Gretna case as
authority for the rule that it must restrict its decision to a review
of the trial court's holding even while exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction. The court further held in the latter case that ex33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38,

206 La. 450, 19 So. (2d) 201 (1944).
Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6549-6550.
Art. 3519, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6549-6550.
206 La. 715, 20 So. (2d) 1 (1944).
P§ L, 1069, 2Q 0, (2d) 365 (1944).

1946]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

633

ceptions of res judicata and of no cause of action will not lie to a
petition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment obtained by fraud. Insofar as the exception of res judicata is con39
cerned, the allegations of fraud inject new issues in the case;
and for the purpose of the exception of no cause of action, all
allegations must be taken as true.
Exceptions to procedural capacity and to the form of action
were sustained in Castille v. Gallagher,40 which involved a summary proceeding to oust a curatrix of an interdict. The first exception was sustained because the law allows such an action only
at the instance of the undercurator except when it is shown that
the undercurator has been called upon to bring the action and has
failed or refused. 41 The next exception was good because such
an action is an ordinary action and cannot be instituted by rule.2
An interesting question was posed upon the allegation and admission that the curatrix had divorced the interdict after the interdiction had been pronounced. The court pondered this, but decided to accept the allegation as true in view of the judicial admissions of both parties.
State v. Younger" is a civil suit growing out of the famous,
or infamous, "Louisiana Scandal" cases. The state and the highway commission" asked for judgment against Younger, ex-Governor Leche, and others for money belonging to the highway
commission, wrongfully withheld by defendants. Suit was filed
in Rapides Parish and judgment in solido against all defendants
was prayed for. Defendant Leche, a resident of St. Tammany
Parish, filed an exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione
personae and, reserving his rights thereunder, simultaneously
filed other dilatory exceptions. The trial court overruled the exception to the jurisdiction and the supreme court granted writs.
Plaintiffs' first contention is that Leche waived any objection to
the jurisdiction ratione personae by filing other exceptions and
hence making an appearance before the court for purposes other
than excepting to the jurisdiction. The court rejected this reasoning and held that under Article 333, Louisiana Code of Practice, the defendant did exactly what the law required him to do
39. See Couret v. Couret, 206 La. 85, 18 So. (2d) 661 (1944).
40. 206 La. 904, 20 So. (2d) 175 (1944).
41. See Art. 409, La. Civil Code of 1870; Arts. 1015, 1016, La. Code of
Practice of 1870.
42. Art. 1017, La. Code of Practice of 1870 and cases cited in the above
opinion.
43. 206 La. 1037, 20 So. (2d) 305 (1944).
44. Now the Department of Highways.
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and hence could not be deemed to have waived the objection to
45
the jurisdiction of the Rapides Parish court.
Plaintiffs admitted that the suit had been compromised and
dismissed as to all defendants other than Leche, but further argued that this was an action ex delicto and thereby jurisdiction
vested in the court having jurisdiction over the place where the
tort Was committed. The court refused to classify this action,
but held that regardless of whether this suit was one ex contractu or one ex delicto the only court having jurisdiction was
the court of defendant's domicile. If the action was ex contractu,
then the court's position was entirely correct.4 6 But if the action
was ex delicto, the jurisdiction of the court would depend upon
whether the tort was one of omission or commission.4 7 Inasmuch
as this suit was brought for money wrongfully withheld, it is
apparent that the tort was one of omission.
Having disposed of these two arguments, the court had no
difficulty in finding authority for the proposition that one who is
sued in solido in a court having jurisdiction of onie of his co-defendants4 8 may successfully object to the jurisdiction if his codefendants are dismissed from the suit.
9 the court sustained an
In State ex rel. Divens v. Johnson,"
exception of lis pendens to a habeas corpus proceeding upon finding that the same parties and the same issues were before the
court in a divorce suit which contained an ancillary proceeding
by rule for the custody of a minor sought to be obtained by the
application for the writ of habeas corpus.
In Miller v. Miller,50 the court found that in this particular
instance exceptions of payment and prescription, though not filed
in the alternative, were not repugnant and would be passed upon.
LeBianc v. Trahan51 decided that an action to quiet a tax title
in accordance with the terms of Louisiana Act 106 of 193452 was
an ordinary action and was subject to the rules of ordinary pro45. This interesting question had been raised by Art. 333, La. Code of
Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 124 of 1936. See Comment (1938) 1
LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 174 for a full discussion of the problems involved
Browne v. Gajan, i73 So. 485 (La. App. 1937) had decided that all declinatory
and dilatory exceptions should be filed together, but this appears to be the
first time that the supreme court has passed squarely upon the issue.
46. Art. 162, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
47. Art. 165(9), La. Code of Practice of 1870. Tripani v. Meraux, 184 La.
66, 165 So. 453 (1936).
48. Which was permissible under Art. 165(6)i La. Code of Practice of
1870.
49. 207 La. 23, 20 So. (2d) 412 (1944).
50. 207 La. 43, 20 So. (2d) 419 (1944).
51. 207 La. 171, 20 So. (2d) 745 (1945).
52. Dart's Stats. (1989) §§ 8502-8504.
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ceedings so as to allow a defendant the legal delays after citation
required by Articles 179 and 180, Code of Practice, despite the
fact that the act recited "that the delay for answer shall be ten

(10) days.

..

.

"5

In Brown v. Boudreaux,5 the court overruled

a plea of res judicata which was predicated upon a judgment
which had never been signed by the trial, judge.55
The case of Dugas v. Powell, 6 which has already been before
the supreme court5 7 and which promises to make a reappearance
on the scene, reiterated the well established doctrine that a plea
of estoppel based merely on silence and inaction, will not serve
to deprive a litigant of his rights when those rights are not yet
barred by prescription. Though not important to the decision,
it would seem that the term "estoppel" as used here, is a misnomer. Is this not actually a plea of laches?
Justice Hamiter, in an opinion excellent both in style and
analysis resolved a most interesting question in Outdoor Electric
Advertising, Incorporated v. Saurage.55 Suit was brought by a
Texas corporation to recover money allegedly owed by defendant
under several written contracts for the erection and maintenance
of certain advertising signs along the highways of Louisiana.
After answer was filed and the trial commenced, counsel for defendant filed an exception alleging that the plaintiff corporation
was not qualified to do business in Louisiana as directed by law5"
and hence by the terms of the statute was forbidden to invoke
the machinery of the Louisiana courts. Defendant did not name
the exception,"° but insisted that it was peremptory in its nature
and could be filed at any stage of the proceedings. The lower
court sustained the exception and dismissed plaintiff's suit. On
appeal the court found that this objection to the prosecution of a
suit had been considered on various occasions but had never been
classified as a dilatory or peremptory exception. Investigating
the nature of the exception, the court found that it did not attempt to test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations and
concluded that it was not an exception of no cause of action. The
court also found that it could not be classified as an exception of
53. Id. at § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8504).
54. 207 La. 233, 21 So. (2d) 44 (1945).
55. The trial judge's signature is, of course, sacramental to a definitive
judgment Art. 546, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
56. 207 La. 316, 21 So. (2d) 366 (1945).
57. See 197 La. 409, 1 So. (2d) 677 (1941).
58. 207 La. 344, 21 So. (2d) 375 (1945).
59. La. Act 8 of 1935 (3 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 1247.1-1247.2].
60. The trial judge, not quite so unimaginative, euphoniously termed it
an "exception to the right to assert a right of action."
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no right of action inasmuch as there was no attempt to traverse
the plaintiff's allegations of interest in the subject matter of the
lawsuit. Examining the function of the exception, the court
found that it could not defeat the lawsuit, but could serve only
to retard its progress. This result is due to the construction of
the statute by which an unauthorized plaintiff is allowed to qualify to do business in the state and resume a case he had instituted
in contravention of the statutory prohibition. Having reached
this conclusion, it naturally follows that the exception was dilatory in its nature", and was waived by not having been filed in
limine.'2
The court sustained an exception of prematurity in Sugar
Field Oil Company, Incorporatedv. Carter" as to plaintiff's first
cause of action, which was for the recovery of a commission allegedly earned by the plaintiff for finding a purchaser for defendant's property, when the defendant proved that there had been
no sale, but only the granting of an option.
An exception to the jurisdiction ratione personae was sustained when plaintiff sought an interpretation of a lease of commercial property situated in East Baton Rouge Parish. Suit was
filed at the situs of the property against a defendant domiciled in
the Parish of Orleans. The court stated that the well-settled rule
that a lease on commercial property gives only a personal right
required the suit to be brought at the domicile of the defendant
under the terms of Article 162, Louisiana Code of Practice."
City of Gretna v. Gulf Distilling Corporation" reversed the
judgment of a district court which sustained an exception of
vagueness. The petition was admittedly vague, but under the
peculiar facts of the case it was perfectly apparent that plaintiff
had alleged all that it could allege and that the defendant was
or should have been in possession of the omitted facts.
Plaintiff appealed from a judgment discharging defendant
from contempt for failure to pay alimony and granting defendant
a certain set-off against the alimony judgment in Cassagne v.
Cassagne.
In the supreme court, the defendant filed for the first
time what he termed an exception of no right or cause of action
based on the theory that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the rule here because it had been filed ancillary
61. Art. 332, La. Code of Practice of 1870.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Art. 333, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
207 La. 453, 21 So. (2d) 495 (1945).
Weber v. H. G. Hill Stores, Inc., 207 La. 500, 21 So. (2d) 510 (1945).
207 La. 719, 21 So. (2d) 884 (1945).
207 La. 1033, 22 So. (2d) 559 (1945).
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to a separation suit, whereas a judgment of divorce had been rendered between the parties in a separate action. Justice Rogers,
the organ of the court, held that the exception was actually a
plea in abatement 67 and, as such, had been waived by not having
68
been filed in limine.
Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland v. Bussa6 9 presented a very interesting and novel problem. It is well settled
that a Louisiana court will take personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if the defendant is found within the confines of the
70
court's jurisdiction and if personal service is made upon him.
However, in the instant case, the court refused to apply this rule
and sustained an exception to the jurisdiction ratione personae
where it was shown that the defendant was lured into Louisiana
from the state of his domicile by fraud and artifice for the express
purpose of subjecting him to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana
courts.
Final Judgment
The determination of when an order of court becomes a final
judgment 7' is often a difficult task, but this term of court seems
to have more than its share of decisions revolving around the
rule that an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment of court
3
72
until that judgment has become final. In Brown v. Boudreaux,
the court overruled an exception of res judicata predicated upon
a judgment of the First City Court of New Orleans which had
never been signed. Not being a final judgment until the judge's
signature is appended thereto, such judgment cannot support a
plea of res judicata.
Carmody v. Land7 4 presented a very interesting application
of the rule. There, the defendant's reconventional demand, converting a jactitory action into a petitory action, had been dismissed under the provisions of Article 3519, Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870,'75 but more than a year elapsed before judgment was
given on the merits in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed, ask67. See Cotton v. Wright, 193 La. 520, 190 So. 665 (1939).
68. Art. 333, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
69. 207 La. 1042, 22 So. (2d) 562 (1945).
70. Art. 165, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
71. Art. 539, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
72. Art. 565, La. Code of Practice of 1870. An exception to the general
rule is announced by Art. 566, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
73. 207 La. 233, 21 So. (2d) 44 (1945).
74. 207 La. 625, 21 So. (2d) 764 (1945).
75. Providing for the dismissal of a suit In case plaintiff allows five
years to elapse without taking steps in the prosecution thereof.
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ing an amendment of the judgment in his favor, and defendant
answered the appeal asking that his reconventional demand be
reinstated. The court, in a well written opinion by Justice Hawthorne,7 6 concluded that the order dismissing the reconventional
demand was not a final judgment because it left undecided the
main demand and hence was not decisive of all points in controversy. Since the decree was merely interlocutory, the court held
that the trial judge's decision could be reviewed on this appeal.
State ex rel. Land v. Martin, Secretary of State," held that
a ruling of the trial court, denying a new trial or rehearing, was
in the nature of an interlocutory judgment from which no appeal
would lie unless the appellant could show that the denial would
cause him irreparable injury. It is to be noted that no appeal
was had from the judgment on the merits, but was limited to the
order denying the new trial or rehearing. This rule was reiterated
in Rapides Central Railway Company v. Missouri Pacific Railway
Company7 8 where the court was constrained to dismiss an appeal
from a judgment overruling exceptions of no right or cause of
action, and in In re Hibernia Bank & Trust Company,7 9 which
involved an appeal from a judgment making absolute a rule for
the possession of sequestered property.80
Habeas Corpus
Four decisions dealing with the writ of habeas corpus were
rendered during this term of court, but no novel doctrines were
announced. State ex rel. Bayer v. White8 1 involved an appeal
from a judgment recalling and rescinding a rule nisi for a writ of
habeas corpus. The court refused to consider the appeal when
it was shown that the party was no longer held in custody on the
ground that the appeal dealt with a moot question.
In State ex rel. Divens v. Johnson,8 2 an exception of lis pendens was maintained upon a showing that the custody of the
minor child sought by the application for a writ of habeas corpus
was also the subject of a rule for custody filed as an ancillary
proceeding to a divorce suit. State ex rel. Steen v. Wade8 3 held
76. Chief Justice O'Niell concurring in the decree.
77. 207 La. 410, 21 So. (2d) 481 (1945).
78. 207 La. 870, 22 So. (2d) 200 (1945).
79. 207 La. 995, 22 So. (2d) 406 (1945).
80. Art. 279, La. Code of Practice of 1870, does not provide for procedure
by rule, but the plaintiff here, who was seeking the release of the property,
was a state official, who was relieved by La. Act 153 of 1912 (Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 707] from furnishing the bond required by Art. 279.
81. 206 La. 200, 19 So. (2d) 47 (1944).
82. 207 La. 23, 20 So. (2d) 412 (1944).
83. 207 La. 177, 20 So. (2d) 747 (1944).
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that a father who was given custody of his minor child by judgment of the district court of LaSalle Parish in a divorce action
could maintain a habeas corpus proceeding there against his
mother-in-law, a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish, who had
actual custody of the child. The court grounded its reasoning
on Article VII, Section 2, Louisiana Constitution of 1921 which
gives the district courts the authority to issue writs of habeas
corpus "in behalf of any person in actual custody in cases within
their respective jurisdictions" and held that the words "within
their respective jurisdictions" modified the word "cases" and not
''
the word "person . 4

State v. Brockners5 was an action to have a minor child declared a neglected child under Louisiana Act 83 of the Extra Session of 1921.88 The court allowed the defendant to invoke its
original jurisdiction and obtain the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.87 The court ordered the release of the minor child to
relator on the strength of affidavits contained in the record.
Real Actions
Only one case of any importance to the field of procedure is
found dealing with the usually numerous real actions. Haas v.
Board of Commissioners of Red River, Atchafalaya and Bayou
Boeuf Levee District," City of New Orleans v. Westwego Canal
0
5
and Terminal Company, Incorporated, and Dugas v. Powell"
are all real actions, but there are no procedural points decided
which can be profitably examined here.
Carmody v. Land,"' however, presented a very interesting
question for decision. Plaintiff had instituted an action of jactitation, commonly called an action of slander of title, and the defendants in their answer alleged ownership of a portion of the
property which was actually possessed by plaintiff. For years
the court has said that this type of plea converts the jactitory
action to a petitory action and places the defendants in the posi84. The defendant in the habeas corpus proceeding had subjected herself
to the jurisdiction of the lower court in the divorce proceeding by intervening and asking to be awarded the custody of the child. However, it is submitted that the deciding factor in the decision is the construction of La.
Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 2. The construction seems strained and the idea
of extending a district court's jurisdiction In this manner appears to be new.
85. 207 La. 465, 21 So. (2d) 499 (1945).
86. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1679-1687.
87. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 2.
88. 206 La. 378, 19 So. (2d) 173 (1944).
89. 206 La. 450, 19 So. (2d) 201 (1944).
90. 207 La. 316, 21 So. (2d) 366 (1945).
91. 207 La. 625, 21 So. (2d) 764 (1945).
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tion of plaintiff, who must rely on the strength of their own title
and not on the weakness of the title of plaintiff.9 2 Acting under
this theory, the lower court, on motion of plaintiff, dismissed defendants' reconventional demand for want of prosecution for five
years.9 3 On appeal, however, the court decided that the language
used in the past had been rather loose and that defendants did
not become plaintiffs within the meaning of Article 3519, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. The judgment of the lower court was accordingly reversed and the cause remanded.9
Supervisory Jurisdiction
The court has consistently held through the years that
though an appeal will not lie from a judgment overruling a declinatory exception, the court will grant supervisory writs to
such a decree so that the defendant will not be required to stand
the expense of a trial which is void from its inception due to the
fact that it is tried before a court which has no jurisdiction.9 5 In
six cases in this term, the court allowed this type of relief."
State v. Beamish97 merely applied Supreme Court Rule 12,
Section 5,95 and refused to allow a rehearing on the court's refusal
to grant supervisory writs.
In Terry v. Wonack 99 the court refused to decide the merits
in a case before it on writs, but properly limited its decision to a
determination of those questions passed on by the lower court.
Interdiction of Escat10 presented the unusual, though not
necessarily novel, situation where the court allowed writs from
a judgment from which there could have been had an immediate
92. Haas v. Board of Com'rs of Red River, Atchafalaya and Bayou Boeuf
Levee Dist., 206 La. 378, 19 So. (2d) 173 (1944).
93. Art. 3519, La. Civil Code of 1870.
94. If the plaintiff had been out of possession, the principal case could
not be questioned because he would still be required to maintain the burden
of proof. Griffon v. Blanc, 12 La. Ann. 5 (1857). And the same is true if
lieither party is in possession. Atchafalaya Land Co. v. Brownell-Drews Lbr.
Co., 130 La. 657, 58 So. 500 (1912). However, in a pure jactitory action, which
requires plaintiff to be in actual possession, as was the case here, does not
defendant become a plaintiff in the true sense of the word? See Millaudon
v. McDonough, 18 La. 102 (1841); Caldwell v. Hennen, 5 Rob. 20 (La. 1848);
Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 855 (1883).
95. However, see Wilson v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 139 La. 648, 71 So. 931
(1916) for the contrary.
96. State v. Younger, 206 La. 1037, 20 So. (2d) 305 (1944); State ex rel.
Divens v. Johnson, 207 La. 23, 20 So. (2d) 412 (1944); State ex rel. Steen v.
Wade, 207 La. 177, 20 So. (2d) 747 (1944); LeBlanc v. Trahan, 207 La. 171, 20
$o. (2d) 745 (1945); Weber v. H. G. Hill Stores, Inc., 207 La. 500, 21 So. (2d)
510 (1945); State v. Savoy, 207 La. 982, 22 So. (2d) 402 (1945).
97. 206 La. 579, 19 So. (2d) 258 (1944).
98. See 191 La. xliv (1939).
99. 206 La. 1069, 20 So. (2d) 365 (1944).
100. 207 La. 228, 21 So. (2d) 43 (1945).
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direct appeal to the court. It felt that under the particular facts
of this case the interests of justice could best be served by the
granting of writs and acted accordingly. The court is absolutely
correct in doing as it did, but it is to be hoped that such a tendency will not result in a deluge of applications.
Another unusual, but equally correct holding, is found in
State v. Brockner,101 where the court demonstrated that it will,
given a proper case, exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and prohibit an inferior court (here the Juvenile Court for the Parish of
St. Tammany) from taking cognizance of a case over which it
has no jurisdiction even though the inferior court has not yet had
an opportunity of ruling on its own jurisdiction.
On consideration of the return of the respondent judge to
the writs granted in Howze v. Holiandsworth,0 2 the court found
that the question had become moot and recalled the writs.
Expert Testimony
Act 19 of 1884103 provides for the payment of "additional
compensation," to be taxed as costs, for the testimony of expert
witnesses. In Womack v. Burka,'0 the court had occasion to interpret this statute and to disallow as costs additional compensation for the testimony of certain physicians who testified only as
to the reasonableness of an operating fee sued for by plaintiff.
The court held that there were only two instances in which a
witness was entitled to a fee for testifying as an expert. One instance is where the witness is called to testify only to an opinion
founded upon a special study or experience in any science or
profession and the other is where the witness is called to make
a scientific or professional examination and to state the results
thereof. Testimony as to the reasonableness of a fee for professional services does not fall within either of these categories.
The court further pointed out that the statute allows such additional compensation only in case the expert testimony is necessary as elucidating a technical or scientific subject. And the reasonableness of a medical fee can be established by testimony
other than that of doctors and physicians.
New Trial
In Nixon v. English,0 5 the court refused to disturb the trial
court's refusal to grant a new trial on the ground of newly dis101. 207 La. 465, 21 So. (2d) 499 (1945).
102. 207 La. 1009, 22 So. (2d) 470 (1945).

103. Dart's Stats. (1939)

§ 1990.

104. 206 La. 251, 19 So. (2d) 127 (1944).

105. 207 La. 906, 22 So. (2d) 266 (1945).
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covered evidence for the reasons that the applicant was not
shown to have exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain
the evidence before trial and it was further apparent that the introduction of the new evidence was not sufficient to change the
trial court's decision on the merits.
Recusation
The well settled rule that a trial judge can enter no order
except one of acquiescence after a motion of recusation is made
was again applied in State of Louisiana v. Savoy.l10 There the
trial judge, after the motion of recusation was made and before
it was passed upon, ordered the dismissal of the suit as to one
of the defendants on the application of plaintiff. The supreme
court granted writs and reversed the lower court's ruling.
Third Opposition
Not unlike a puppy chasing its tail is the case of Atkins v.
Smith,'0 which was a demand for the balance due on a contract
to sell certain unimproved real property to defendant. Plaintiff
asked for recognition of her vendor's lien, even though she was
still record owner of the property, the contract never having been
reduced to one of sale. A final judgment by default was rendered for plaintiff and she caused the issuance of a writ of fieri
facias. At this time, defendant's husband filed a third opposition
alleging ownership of a house he had erected upon the property
and asking that he be paid the value of the house out of the proceeds of the sale. A sheriff's sale was had and the property was
adjudicated to plaintiff. The third opponent appealed to the
Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, from an order dismissing his
opposition. That court held 1°8 that plaintiff was not entitled to
a vendor's lien and dismissed as of nonsuit the third opposition.
The supreme court granted writs and reversed the decision of
the court of appeal. 109 When remanded to the court of appeal,
that court rejected the demand of the third opponent; 1 0 and the
supreme court granted a writ of review, which brings us to the
principal case. Justice Rogers, 4fter discussing the rights of one
who improves the real property of another, held that the plaintiff
had acquired nothing by virtue of the sheriff's sale, and since she
was still the owner of the property, and as the defendant and
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

207 La. 982, 22 So. (2d) 402 (1945).
207 La. 560, 21 So. (2d) 728 (1945).
21 So. (2d) 85 (La. App. 1942).
204 La. 468, 15 So. (2d) 855 (1943).
21 So. (2d) 89 (La. App. 1944).
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heirs of the third opponent"1 were still the owners of the contract, the parties, like the puppy mentioned above, were right
back where they had started from. Third opponent had appeared
in the case solely because of the proposed sheriff's sale and as
the sale had been annulled, there was nothing left in the case
upon which a judgment for the third opponent could be based.
VII. EVIDENCE
Robert A. Pascal*
Opinion Evidence
The admissibility of opinion evidence on matters of sanity
and competency is now generally recognized, as long as such
opinions are conclusions based on observed data and not merely
expressions of belief without foundation in the experience of
the witness.' The extent to which the background data, or "facts
on which the opinion is based," must be made known varies from
court to court. 2 In Interdiction of Escats the supreme court declared error the admission of opinions of a psychiatrist and a layman as to the capacity of the defendant to manage her affairs on
the ground that "Neither of these witnesses, as a predicate for
his opinion, has stated any facts or circumstances upon which it
is based and from which the court is able to form and decree its
own conclusions." 4
It is no doubt wise for a court to ascertain that the experience of an expert or lay witness qualifies him to render the opinion offered in evidence; but to require a statement of the facts
on which the opinion is based so that the court may form its own
opinion is another matter. This, in effect, is to pit the opinion of
the witness against that of the court and in so doing to overlook
the reason for accepting opinion evidence. An opinion is admitted, if at all, because in the particular instance the witness
is better able than the court to evaluate the data correctly.5 The
expert witness' special training or experience renders him more
qualified than the court to interpret facts perhaps equally available to both. A layman's opinion may be more valuable than
111. The third opponent died during the pendency of the suit, but it is
small wonder-this type of litigation would worry anyone to death!
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Wigmore. A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in
Trials at Common Law (3 ed. 1940) H 1933-1938.
2. Id. at § 1938.
3. 206 La. 207, 19 So. (2d) 96 (1944).
4. 206 La. 207, 212; 19 So. (2d) 96.
5. Cf. Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 1917(8)-1924.

